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 Book Reviews
 after 1962) the Court's most influential and creative Justice, but Horwitz's treat-
 ment of him sometimes borders on hero worship.
 His explanation for the Warren Court's liberalism, although provocative, is not
 entirely persuasive. Horwitz attributes it to the fact that the members of the liber-
 al majority were "outsiders" who shared "socially marginal origins" (11). Most of
 them did come from humble and sometimes difficult backgrounds. Thurgood
 Marshall was black and others were, by virtue of their ethnicity, religion, and/or
 the fact that they were from immigrant families "cultural outsiders." The problem
 with this explanation for the Warren Court's liberalism is that the same things could
 be said of Felix Frankfurter and Tom Clark, two of its leading conservatives.
 Specialists will find other points with which to quibble. For example, Dennis v.
 United States (1951) did not raise "the question of whether individuals could be
 convicted for mere speech" (57); it was a prosecution for conspiracy to teach and
 advocate the violent overthrow of the government, a distinction that mattered a great
 deal, at least to Justice Robert Jackson. Only a few Pollyannas will agree with
 Horwitz that "it would be mistaken to dismiss the [Warren] Court's efforts to deal
 with the constitutionality of obscenity as a failure" (104).
 The merits of his book far outnumber such minor flaws. It is, for example, ex-
 cellent at explicating the interaction between the Warren Court and the civil rights
 movement. Horwitz illuminates most effectively the philosophical issues under-
 lying the Court's internal debates over the sit-in cases. He also makes the contro-
 versy over the "countermajoritarian difficulty" comprehensible to readers without
 a background in constitutional law and explains in a way they can understand why
 the conception of democracy relied on by proponents of judicial self-restraint, such
 as Frankfurter, is simplistic. Horwitz is particularly good at elucidating the rela-
 tionship between democracy and the protection of minority rights.
 He sought, he says, to write a book for those who wish "to acquire some intro-
 ductory knowledge of the historical significance of the Supreme Court without
 being distracted or intimidated by legal technicalities" and to "show the general
 reader how interesting and exciting the intense study of a particular, focused his-
 torical era of the Supreme Court can be" (xi). Horwitz has achieved his objectives.
 He has written a book about the Warren Court that would make a valuable addi-
 tion to the reading list of any constitutional history course or any class on the post-
 World War II period.
 Michael R. Belknap
 California Western School of Law and
 University of California, San Diego
 Gary Minda, Boycott in America: How Imagination and Ideology Shape the
 Legal Mind, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1999. Pp. 271.
 $39.00 (ISBN 0-8093-2174-2).
 In an appendix to his The Common Law Tradition, the Legal Realist Karl Llewel-
 lyn offered a devastating critique of the idea that judges could decide cases sim-
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 ply by following precedent. In this appendix Llewellyn presented a comprehen-
 sive set of canons of statutory interpretation drawn from case law. His brilliant
 contribution was to show how these could be arranged in matched contradictory
 pairs, thrust_parry. For every maxim of statutory interpretation available to judg-
 es from somewhere in the prior case law, it turned out that there was another max-
 im also extracted from some place in the case law that would lead them to exactly
 the opposite conclusion. One canon of interpretation would say, for example, "a
 statute cannot go beyond its text." But its matched opposite proclaimed that "to
 effect its purpose a statute may be implemented beyond its text." Another would
 say "statutes in derogation of the common law will not be extended by construc-
 tion," while its matched opposite would say "such acts will be liberally construed
 if their nature is remedial" (appendix C, 522).
 One large problem for the idea of objective, rational judging that Llewellyn
 helped to lay bare here was that judges often had a choice among the rules of law
 they could decide to apply in a given case. And it was difficult to see how this initial
 choice among rules, which in effect dictated the result, could be based upon any-
 thing other than the personal or political preferences of judges. This was a terrible
 problem for the theory of adjudication, given that we live under a system of laws
 and not men. School after school of legal theorist has struggled since then to show
 that adjudication can be placed on more solid foundations.
 Within Legal Realism itself one group tried to show that this choice among rules
 could be rationalized and placed on an objective footing through empirical inves-
 tigations of the social and economic consequences of different legal policies, choos-
 ing the one in each situation that best promoted "the public good." Later schools
 attempted other answers. In recent decades, the law and economics movement has
 tried to show that choices among rules could be objectively based upon "efficien-
 cy" analysis-choose the rule or policy that best promotes "efficiency" in the cir-
 cumstances, making society as a whole better off.
 In the 1970s and 80s the Critical Legal Studies movement picked up the Real-
 ist critique and pushed it further. Critics presented compelling arguments that all
 the extant attempted solutions to the problem of adjudication had fundamental flaws
 and that, in fact, no solution was possible. There was no way around it. Adjudica-
 tion inevitably involved the preferences, political and otherwise, of judges.
 Gary Minda's new book, Boycott, is written as a kind of next generation contri-
 bution to this story. It accepts that there is no solution for the problem of adjudi-
 cation and goes on to ask, in light of that: how does judge-made legal doctrine
 actually come to be structured in the ways that it does, and how does this structur-
 ing come to be made to seem apolitical?
 Minda's book looks at boycott and the law's response to it as a way of getting
 at these questions. It begins by describing the historical origins of the term boy-
 cott in the Irish land wars of the late nineteenth century. An entire Irish communi-
 ty sought to pressure a grasping land agent, Captain Boycott, by cutting off all social
 and economic relations with him. "No one would buy from him: no one would sell
 to him.... He was unable to harvest his own land or transact business of any kind
 in the community" (25). This type of concerted activity, of course, predated the
 term boycott itself but henceforth "boycott" would be one of the labels applied to
 similar conduct in our own country.
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 For Minda the significance of the Captain Boycott story is that it shows boy-
 cott to be a complex social, economic, and political phenomenon. Such concerted
 activity can be characterized in at least two polar opposite ways. It is possible to
 focus on the harms the boycottee has inflicted on numerous members of the com-
 munity and to see the community's response as a peaceful attempt to win justice
 and vindicate rights. Or it is possible to focus on the harms the boycotters mean
 to inflict on the boycottee, and the fact that it is many against one, and to see their
 activity as illegitimate group coercion, even a kind of violence. Both perspectives
 capture part of the truth about many boycotts and in a great many situations it is
 possible to adopt either perspective. Why then should one perspective dominate
 one branch of the law dealing with boycotts and the other another branch?
 From late nineteenth-century state common law decisions through twentieth-
 century judicial interpretations of the secondary boycott provisions of the Nation-
 al Labor Relations Act, Minda shows, judges have fashioned legal doctrines to
 prohibit a variety of different kinds of boycott activity when they were undertak-
 en by labor organizations. On the other hand, judges have sometimes insulated
 similar conduct from legal attack when a group other than a labor organization was
 responsible. In the early 1980s, the United States Supreme Court set aside a state
 court tort judgment against a Civil Rights group for the economic damage it in-
 flicted on white-owned businesses in Claibore County, Mississippi, by boycott-
 ing the businesses. The high court ruled that the Civil Rights boycott, which pro-
 tested the racially discriminatory practices of the white businesses, represented a
 form of political expression protected by the First Amendment. Yet it is clear that
 one of the goals of the Civil Rights group could be characterized as self-interest-
 edly economic, to win jobs for black people by attacking discriminatory hiring
 practices. But this boycott was classified and dealt with differently than some sim-
 ilarly motivated boycotts undertaken by organized labor. A short time before, the
 Supreme Court had held that a boycott of Russian ships mounted by the Interna-
 tional Longshoremen's Union to protest the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, a
 politically motivated boycott, was not insulated by the First Amendment but vio-
 lated the secondary boycott provisions of the national labor laws.
 The main thrust of Minda's book is to show that the very language judges use
 to describe boycott in these different contexts prejudges the case, as it were, and
 is responsible for structuring differently the responses of the law to boycott in these
 different contexts. In the labor context, the dominant metaphors imbedded in the
 cases have mainly reflected the perspective of boycottees. Civil Rights activity by
 contrast has, at least in recent years, been described as political protest, in the
 honored tradition of the Revolutionary era American boycott of British goods,
 descriptive language from the boycotters' perspective that in effect decides the case.
 Minda can perhaps be faulted for presenting the law's response to labor boy-
 cotts as more monolithic and unchanging than it was. Between the late nineteenth
 century and the middle of the twentieth century, the law did begin to give labor
 somewhat more leeway to engage in certain specific kinds of boycott activity for
 certain specific purposes, although it continued to condemn many other kinds of
 labor boycott activity. This is a complicated partial story of which we get little sense
 here. Perhaps Minda can also be faulted for jumping too quickly from one histor-
 ical context to another without adequately exploring the changes in basic social
 Book Reviews  439
 Law and History Review, Summer 2002
 assumptions that took place between periods. But given that he has not really set
 out to write a history of law, that his project is directed toward examining the con-
 duct of legal reasoning, these are minor objections. A more serious problem, it
 seems to me, is that while Minda's focus on metaphors may help us to understand
 the deep images judges relied on to decide cases, it does not really explain why
 judges were drawn to one image rather than another in the first place. There is not
 enough here about the way these understandings were contested and struggled over
 and how judges, in the face of these struggles, embraced the understandings that
 they did.
 This is nevertheless an interesting, provocative book that uses modem language
 theory to try to delve beneath the surface of legal doctrine to expose some of the
 underlying processes that are responsible for shaping it.
 Robert J. Steinfeld
 State University of New York at Buffalo
 Peter Kwong, Forbidden Workers: Illegal Chinese Immigrants and American
 Labor, New York: New Press, 1997. Pp. 273 + xii. $24.00 cloth (ISBN 1-56584-
 355-X), $14.95 paper (ISBN 1-56584-517-X).
 Despite a century of legal and social gains for American workers, today "modem-
 day coolies" still toil under almost incomprehensible hardship within the United
 States. Hunter College historian Peter Kwong unveils this dark side of the thriv-
 ing American economy in Forbidden Workers: Illegal Chinese Immigrants and
 American Labor, a work that examines the plight of Chinese labor and prescribes
 legal reforms and labor organizing to treat the growing problem. Among the fig-
 ures Kwong profiles is Zhen, a former schoolteacher from outside the seacoast city
 of Fuzhou, in southeast China. Smugglers, appropriately known as "snakeheads,"
 brought Zhen to New York City at a cost to him of roughly $30,000-which he
 and illegal immigrants in similar predicaments are required to pay back in three
 years time. In Chinatown, Zhen works any jobs he can find, depending upon a
 corrupt employment agency where he competes with hundreds of other undocu-
 mented immigrants. Fourteen-hour days at Chinese restaurants or sweatshops bare-
 ly provide Zhen with the money both to live and pay back the snakeheads. The
 threat of retribution against either him or his family constantly hangs over Zhen
 should he fail to meet his payments. He shares an apartment with over a dozen
 illegals and subsists on a diet of fermented bean curd and cheap steamed buns.
 While Zhen regrets his decision to come to the United States, his alternatives seem
 limited. China today, thanks to the state-directed capitalism of Deng Xiaoping, is
 undergoing an economic upheaval that has left nearly one million unemployed.
 Kwong is particularly effective in depicting the complicated journey of the
 Chinese migrants, the overwhelming number of whom hail from Fujian Province.
 The journey-vividly described as a sort of baseball game, where one moves from
 base to base-carries migrants first to Southeast Asia, onto Central America or
 Mexico, then finally to the United States, and ultimately to the outskirts of New
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